Winning football: Third/Fourth downs, turnovers, explosion plays

[NUCat320]

I don’t have the stats, of course, but I’ve believed for about a decade that winning two out of the three categories above means a victory.

For so long, NU eschewed even trying for the big play. This meant that the defense needed to take the ball away, and especially that NU needed to keep the ball on third down. Or fourth down. And it’s no coincidence that NU’s most consistent success came when NU got aggressive on fourth down.

NU was bad on third downs today — only 3 of 12. NU had only 9 g-d first downs to Maryland’s 25.

But, Kirtz had two deep deep catches and Henning another, while Maryland eked out three, including one after the game was decided.

It’s so nice to have a head coach and an OC that seek to move the ball through deep completions. It’s on tape now, and it’ll lead to more underneath room, more scrambling room, and hopefully — eventually? — some room to run. Take the top off the defense and suddenly you’ve got space underneath. It’ll be beautiful.

(Aside: Komolafe had been in the doghouse since he lost a fumble early on. He provided a spark that I’d hoped to see all season tonight.)


What a satisfying win.

 

[EvanstonCat]

I don’t have the stats, of course, but I’ve believed for about a decade that winning two out of the three categories above means a victory.

For so long, NU eschewed even trying for the big play. This meant that the defense needed to take the ball away, and especially that NU needed to keep the ball on third down. Or fourth down. And it’s no coincidence that NU’s most consistent success came when NU got aggressive on fourth down.

NU was bad on third downs today — only 3 of 12. NU had only 9 g-d first downs to Maryland’s 25.

But, Kirtz had two deep deep catches and Henning another, while Maryland eked out three, including one after the game was decided.

It’s so nice to have a head coach and an OC that seek to move the ball through deep completions. It’s on tape now, and it’ll lead to more underneath room, more scrambling room, and hopefully — eventually? — some room to run. Take the top off the defense and suddenly you’ve got space underneath. It’ll be beautiful.

(Aside: Komolafe had been in the doghouse since he lost a fumble early on. He provided a spark that I’d hoped to see all season tonight.)


What a satisfying win.

This. I don’t think we can or should live and die on relying solely on the D. The O is still mediocre, but exactly your point - we took shots, we got some explosive plays, and we were able to score when given the chance.

Make no mistake though, without a +4 TO margin including a scoop and score, it’s doubtful we win. The O showed something, but still needs to improve. 3/12 on 3rd down conversions and 9 total first downs ain’t going to win many ball games. Glad this was one of them.

 

[Katatonic]

The other way to win is doing what Vandy did to Bama last week.

Ball control and converting a high no of 3rd downs by making them manageable (made easier by having a QB who can extend passing plays with his legs or get the 1st down himself) and not consistently being in 3rd and long.

Vandy only punted on 2 drives and neither was 3 and out (something that happened all too frequently for the Cats over the past decade).

But the thing is, in order to run that kind of "complementary O" need a decent O-line and good backs.

But even then, an opposing D can sell out to stop the run, so need a plan B (explosive plays down field).

The problem with Fitz Turtle ball is that Pat usually wasn't willing to let the O loose until they were already behind by 3 scores, which created the very game environment that Fitz wanted to avoid - an environment conducive to having turnovers.

 

[freewillie07]

This. I don’t think we can or should live and die on relying solely on the D. The O is still mediocre, but exactly your point - we took shots, we got some explosive plays, and we were able to score when given the chance.

Make no mistake though, without a +4 TO margin including a scoop and score, it’s doubtful we win. The O showed something, but still needs to improve. 3/12 on 3rd down conversions and 9 total first downs ain’t going to win many ball games. Glad this was one of them.

We did not need +4 in turnovers to win.

To win by 27? Sure.

But the sccop and score was revenge for the BS no-safety and put us up 24-10. By that point I was pretty darn comfortable the Cats would pull it out. Rest of the TOs were just Maryland being demoralized.

 

[NUCat320]

The other way to win is doing what Vandy did to Bama last week.

Ball control and converting a high no of 3rd downs by making them manageable (made easier by having a QB who can extend passing plays with his legs or get the 1st down himself) and not consistently being in 3rd and long.

Vandy only punted on 2 drives and neither was 3 and out (something that happened all too frequently for the Cats over the past decade).

But the thing is, in order to run that kind of "complementary O" need a decent O-line and good backs.

But even then, an opposing D can sell out to stop the run, so need a plan B (explosive plays down field).

The problem with Fitz Turtle ball is that Pat usually wasn't willing to let the O loose until they were already behind by 3 scores, which created the very game environment that Fitz wanted to avoid - an environment conducive to having turnovers.

I didn’t see the Vandy game, but the stats tell me that Vandy slightly outdid Bama on third downs (12-18 to 3-6) and won the turnover battle (2-0). (Based on third down attempts, Bama obviously won the ‘big play’ game.)

Mostly, I don’t think there’s much correlation between time of possession and winning football, even though that *was* football orthodoxy for a long time. Ya gotta do something with the ball too.

There’s always noise and correlation/causation whatevers, but the relationship usually holds.

 

[Figrating]

I was hoping our new OC Coach Lujan would bring a system that would instantly make the NU O a level better. Something like Bill Walsh did with the "West Coast Offense" or like Randy Walker did with the spread at NU. Not happening. Instead we're paying dues while the team is learning how to play together in the new system. Instead of "instant" we're getting "slowly, slowly", but there's little doubt the NU O is improving. Lausch is improving so fast you can see it game by game.

Completed - not just tried - but COMPLETED SEVERAL deep passes. Henning dropped a huge one, too. Future opponents will take note and no longer presume NU is still stuck in Fitzball and get away with it. Should take some heat off the OL, who are getting torn up. (Remember when JJTBC played for NU and it didn't matter?)

Much was being made of the fact that NU had been losing every game they traveled by plane to play. Nice to break out of that rut.

Is NU following the pattern of last season? Looks like it, but they face a tougher schedule this season.

GO CATS!

 

[FanatiCat]

I was hoping our new OC Coach Lujan would bring a system that would instantly make the NU O a level better. Something like Bill Walsh did with the "West Coast Offense" or like Randy Walker did with the spread at NU. Not happening. Instead we're paying dues while the team is learning how to play together in the new system. Instead of "instant" we're getting "slowly, slowly", but there's little doubt the NU O is improving. Lausch is improving so fast you can see it game by game.

Completed - not just tried - but COMPLETED SEVERAL deep passes. Henning dropped a huge one, too. Future opponents will take note and no longer presume NU is still stuck in Fitzball and get away with it. Should take some heat off the OL, who are getting torn up. (Remember when JJTBC played for NU and it didn't matter?)

Much was being made of the fact that NU had been losing every game they traveled by plane to play. Nice to break out of that rut.

Is NU following the pattern of last season? Looks like it, but they face a tougher schedule this season.

GO CATS!

Randy Walker and Kevin Wilson was over a generation of college football ago (much as I hate to age myself). The spread was much more of a revolution than anything you can come up with now - every defense expects to play spread, RPO teams.

In addition they had a roster of blue chip offensive talent, benefiting from Barnett’s post Rose/Citrus recruiting that was just primed for the spread scheme. The Fab 5 OL recruits, Heisman finalist DA2, Sam Simmons, and Kustok. Because of our deficiencies in recruiting skill positions in the latter PF years along with portal attrition (Tyus, Priebe come to mind), we have less depth and more developmental prospects.

If the portal and NIL existed in 1998, can you imagine how many of those guys we would’ve lost?

 

[Alaskawildkat]

But the sccop and score was revenge for the BS no-safety and put us up 24-10. By that point I was pretty darn comfortable the Cats would pull it out. Rest of the TOs were just Maryland being demoralized.

Exactly! That was my immediate come to mind comment on the in game Zoom chat after the scoop and score: "That makes up for the [denied] safety."

 

[AdamOnFirst]

3rd down conversions are largely downstream of everything else. You have success on third down largely by having success on first and second downs. NU really struggles to run the ball and has a very mediocre passing game, albeit one that’s a LITTLE explosive, ergo it’s hard for them to have consistent, high percentage win plays on early downs. It’s also harder to convert short yardage, it’s just harder to do everything.

This is… not overly insightful analysis, the point is that “third down” isn’t some magic extra capability, it’s just downstream of everything and conversion wraps up most elements of the game into it.

 

[CoralSpringsCat]

Randy Walker and Kevin Wilson was over a generation of college football ago (much as I hate to age myself). The spread was much more of a revolution than anything you can come up with now - every defense expects to play spread, RPO teams.

In addition they had a roster of blue chip offensive talent, benefiting from Barnett’s post Rose/Citrus recruiting that was just primed for the spread scheme. The Fab 5 OL recruits, Heisman finalist DA2, Sam Simmons, and Kustok. Because of our deficiencies in recruiting skill positions in the latter PF years along with portal attrition (Tyus, Priebe come to mind), we have less depth and more developmental prospects.

If the portal and NIL existed in 1998, can you imagine how many of those guys we would’ve lost?

Darnell Autry never plays in the Rose Bowl. I can assure you that.

 

[NUCat320]

3rd down conversions are largely downstream of everything else. You have success on third down largely by having success on first and second downs. NU really struggles to run the ball and has a very mediocre passing game, albeit one that’s a LITTLE explosive, ergo it’s hard for them to have consistent, high percentage win plays on early downs. It’s also harder to convert short yardage, it’s just harder to do everything.

This is… not overly insightful analysis, the point is that “third down” isn’t some magic extra capability, it’s just downstream of everything and conversion wraps up most elements of the game into it.

Actually third down is of course totally independent of turnovers, and conversion performance measures a different thing than explosive plays (20+ yarders, generally, plus special teams plays and defensive touchdowns).

The key about third down is that it’s a reflection of a team’s mental state. Lots of stops invigorates a defense, lots of failures demoralize a defense. (And the converse for offenses.) Big plays have a different effect — oh eff, we screwed up once, is way easier brush off than OMG they keep making the clutch plays.

I mostly developed my pet (unmeasured, intuitive) theory based on my annoyance with anybody obsessing over time of possession, and also with retrograde “gotta run the ball and gotta stop the run” approaches, which are straight out of the 80s.

Successfully converting on third and fourth down is often a mentality, and it’s consistent. And at long last, coaches (Fitz was an innovator here) now play to set up a reasonable fourth down attempt versus trying to get all the ‘and long’ back on a single attempt. Every fourth conversion is just a +1 to the third down number. And the more aggressive teams are typically the better ones.

Again, time of possession was a stupid measure which did not capture that great offenses don’t need the ball long. Running the ball is often irrelevant.

Anyway, that’s MY universal theory of winning football games. A casual look at box scores (and a strong and inherently human confirmation bias) shows me it works.

What’s your Universal Theory?

 

[FanatiCat]

Darnell Autry never plays in the Rose Bowl. I can assure you that.

Do you know this from inside info? He hadn’t done much in college before the Rose Bowl year. He was a pretty highly rated recruit and I recall in Barnett’s book he did have to talk him into coming back to NU for that year but I don’t recall if it was because he had an offer to transfer to ASU or what.

 

[CoralSpringsCat]

Do you know this from inside info? He hadn’t done much in college before the Rose Bowl year. He was a pretty highly rated recruit and I recall in Barnett’s book he did have to talk him into coming back to NU for that year but I don’t recall if it was because he had an offer to transfer to ASU or what.

Yes. The staff had to play hard ball and not grant him his release; he would have had to sit a year before playing elsewhere. Actually, DA showed a lot of potential the year prior to the Rose Bowl. He had a some solid games in NUs Big Ten wins (on the road at MN & IN) and in a loss vs highly ranked Penn State if memory serves me. He was one of the reasons for optimism entering 1995.

 

[AdamOnFirst]

Actually third down is of course totally independent of turnovers, and conversion performance measures a different thing than explosive plays (20+ yarders, generally, plus special teams plays and defensive touchdowns).

The key about third down is that it’s a reflection of a team’s mental state. Lots of stops invigorates a defense, lots of failures demoralize a defense. (And the converse for offenses.) Big plays have a different effect — oh eff, we screwed up once, is way easier brush off than OMG they keep making the clutch plays.

I mostly developed my pet (unmeasured, intuitive) theory based on my annoyance with anybody obsessing over time of possession, and also with retrograde “gotta run the ball and gotta stop the run” approaches, which are straight out of the 80s.

Successfully converting on third and fourth down is often a mentality, and it’s consistent. And at long last, coaches (Fitz was an innovator here) now play to set up a reasonable fourth down attempt versus trying to get all the ‘and long’ back on a single attempt. Every fourth conversion is just a +1 to the third down number. And the more aggressive teams are typically the better ones.

Again, time of possession was a stupid measure which did not capture that great offenses don’t need the ball long. Running the ball is often irrelevant.

Anyway, that’s MY universal theory of winning football games. A casual look at box scores (and a strong and inherently human confirmation bias) shows me it works.

What’s your Universal Theory?

My universal theory is this is a terrible universal theory. Third down conversion is like greens in regulation: it’s a final outcome stat that is downstream of much of the rest of the game and many other smaller outcomes. You can’t draw conclusions from third down conversion immediately because it has so many inputs. If a golfer has an excellent greens in reg number, why is this? Is he amazing off the tee and hits it close all the time and has easy wedge shots in? Is he wild off the tee but an amazing iron player? It’s the end result of several smaller data points upstream, and we need to go deeper to identify improvements.

If a team is great on third down, it’s usually because they’re awesome on first and second down and they face a ton of third and shorts that are easy to convert at a high level. Of course, if they’re great on first and second down, they’re probably just a great offense in general. They’re great on every down, so of course they’re great on third down.

So looking at third down conversion as a metric is pretty wide lens, it’s basically just saying “this team has a good offense.”

I actually just talked with a coach about this (I didn’t bring it up, he was explaining his key numbers his staff was tracking for his team and focusing on improvement of). Their big key was success rate on first and second down (dunno how he defined this, usually it means 3-4 yards on each down depending on the system you’re using). He explicitly said “yeah our third down conversion percent is really amazing and we’re proud of that guy really what we’re tracking is first and second down success [etc].”

 

[NUCat320]

My universal theory is this is a terrible universal theory. Third down conversion is like greens in regulation: it’s a final outcome stat that is downstream of much of the rest of the game and many other smaller outcomes. You can’t draw conclusions from third down conversion immediately because it has so many inputs. If a golfer has an excellent greens in reg number, why is this? Is he amazing off the tee and hits it close all the time and has easy wedge shots in? Is he wild off the tee but an amazing iron player? It’s the end result of several smaller data points upstream, and we need to go deeper to identify improvements.

If a team is great on third down, it’s usually because they’re awesome on first and second down and they face a ton of third and shorts that are easy to convert at a high level. Of course, if they’re great on first and second down, they’re probably just a great offense in general. They’re great on every down, so of course they’re great on third down.

So looking at third down conversion as a metric is pretty wide lens, it’s basically just saying “this team has a good offense.”

I actually just talked with a coach about this (I didn’t bring it up, he was explaining his key numbers his staff was tracking for his team and focusing on improvement of). Their big key was success rate on first and second down (dunno how he defined this, usually it means 3-4 yards on each down depending on the system you’re using). He explicitly said “yeah our third down conversion percent is really amazing and we’re proud of that guy really what we’re tracking is first and second down success [etc].”

(Defense exists too.)

 

[CoralSpringsCat]

My universal theory is this is a terrible universal theory. Third down conversion is like greens in regulation: it’s a final outcome stat that is downstream of much of the rest of the game and many other smaller outcomes. You can’t draw conclusions from third down conversion immediately because it has so many inputs. If a golfer has an excellent greens in reg number, why is this? Is he amazing off the tee and hits it close all the time and has easy wedge shots in? Is he wild off the tee but an amazing iron player? It’s the end result of several smaller data points upstream, and we need to go deeper to identify improvements.

If a team is great on third down, it’s usually because they’re awesome on first and second down and they face a ton of third and shorts that are easy to convert at a high level. Of course, if they’re great on first and second down, they’re probably just a great offense in general. They’re great on every down, so of course they’re great on third down.

So looking at third down conversion as a metric is pretty wide lens, it’s basically just saying “this team has a good offense.”

I actually just talked with a coach about this (I didn’t bring it up, he was explaining his key numbers his staff was tracking for his team and focusing on improvement of). Their big key was success rate on first and second down (dunno how he defined this, usually it means 3-4 yards on each down depending on the system you’re using). He explicitly said “yeah our third down conversion percent is really amazing and we’re proud of that guy really what we’re tracking is first and second down success [etc].”

Love this analogy. I think another telling stat would be average distance to go on 3rd down. Teams that avoid “getting behind the sticks” are far more likely to convert on 3rd as you pointed out.

 

[FanatiCat]

Yes. The staff had to play hard ball and not grant him his release; he would have had to sit a year before playing elsewhere. Actually, DA showed a lot of potential the year prior to the Rose Bowl. He had a some solid games in NUs Big Ten wins (on the road at MN & IN) and in a loss vs highly ranked Penn State if memory serves me. He was one of the reasons for optimism entering 1995.

I remember the 1994 PSU game and thought that was his only game with a substantial performance as a true frosh, so I didn’t think he would have been a top transfer target going into 1995. Regardless, you’re right, whatever his reasons for wanting to leave NU or his offers for transfer, it would’ve been way easier for him to do with 2024 rules.

 

[CoralSpringsCat]

I remember the 1994 PSU game and thought that was his only game with a substantial performance as a true frosh, so I didn’t think he would have been a top transfer target going into 1995. Regardless, you’re right, whatever his reasons for wanting to leave NU or his offers for transfer, it would’ve been way easier for him to do with 2024 rules.

His desire to leave was prior to 2024. He was very home sick. Wanted to get back to Arizona. His PSU performance was a game changer for both him and NU.

 

[hdhntr1]

I don’t have the stats, of course, but I’ve believed for about a decade that winning two out of the three categories above means a victory.

For so long, NU eschewed even trying for the big play. This meant that the defense needed to take the ball away, and especially that NU needed to keep the ball on third down. Or fourth down. And it’s no coincidence that NU’s most consistent success came when NU got aggressive on fourth down.

NU was bad on third downs today — only 3 of 12. NU had only 9 g-d first downs to Maryland’s 25.

But, Kirtz had two deep deep catches and Henning another, while Maryland eked out three, including one after the game was decided.

It’s so nice to have a head coach and an OC that seek to move the ball through deep completions. It’s on tape now, and it’ll lead to more underneath room, more scrambling room, and hopefully — eventually? — some room to run. Take the top off the defense and suddenly you’ve got space underneath. It’ll be beautiful.

(Aside: Komolafe had been in the doghouse since he lost a fumble early on. He provided a spark that I’d hoped to see all season tonight.)


What a satisfying win.

You don't generally hit 3 of 3 on deep balls. Gotta realize that they are sorta forced to try something of that nature as the other areas of the O are pretty weak with little running game and intermediate pass game

 

[hdhntr1]

Do you know this from inside info? He hadn’t done much in college before the Rose Bowl year. He was a pretty highly rated recruit and I recall in Barnett’s book he did have to talk him into coming back to NU for that year but I don’t recall if it was because he had an offer to transfer to ASU or what.

Wasn't he only a Soph (or RS Soph that year) I think he played the next year and opted out of his last year. Since so far we have generally held on till people graduate and then tend to lose them but he was still pretty early in his career.. And we had a pretty good OL at that time. But I do think he was homesick after his first year

 

[AdamOnFirst]

Love this analogy. I think another telling stat would be average distance to go on 3rd down. Teams that avoid “getting behind the sticks” are far more likely to convert on 3rd as you pointed out.

I wish there were more readily available weighted third down conversion rate stats. Like, okay, a team is 50% on 3rd down, but if their distribution of 3rd downs skews to short yardage at a very above average rate, that might actually make them worse than you'd expect on third down (or vice versa). So stats from different yardages (like 1 yard, 2-4 yards, 5-7 yards, and 8+ yards maybe), or some kind of weighted number that expressed their distribution of third downs. Because I DO think there are teams that are good or bad at third down in particular independent of their previous down success, but I'd like to have a stat to see it.

This is where my baseball fandom comes out. Ultimately college football is more about arguing about scheme and having fun at the crazy upsets and pageantry than it is generating a perfect stat that expresses player value. That's what baseball is for.

 

[NUCat320]

Love this analogy. I think another telling stat would be average distance to go on 3rd down. Teams that avoid “getting behind the sticks” are far more likely to convert on 3rd as you pointed out.

I wish there were more readily available weighted third down conversion rate stats. Like, okay, a team is 50% on 3rd down, but if their distribution of 3rd downs skews to short yardage at a very above average rate, that might actually make them worse than you'd expect on third down (or vice versa). So stats from different yardages (like 1 yard, 2-4 yards, 5-7 yards, and 8+ yards maybe), or some kind of weighted number that expressed their distribution of third downs. Because I DO think there are teams that are good or bad at third down in particular independent of their previous down success, but I'd like to have a stat to see it.

This is where my baseball fandom comes out. Ultimately college football is more about arguing about scheme and having fun at the crazy upsets and pageantry than it is generating a perfect stat that expresses player value. That's what baseball is for.

Greens in regulation is, presumably, highly correlated with strong performance in tournaments. Similarly, third down conversions are highly correlated with victories (along with turnover margin and explosive plays on offense.)

It doesn’t mean that you actively *try* for high third down conversion rates, but it does mean that if your team performs well in that category, it is more likely to win. You don’t build your strategy around third downs, but when you perform on them (continue the drive, get the opponent off the field), you’re likelier to win.

The breakdown would be interesting in a “lots of numbers on a screen” way, but the top line tells a lot as shorthand.


Again, just something I’ve noticed over time and pay attention to.

Make more big plays,
Protect the ball better,
Stay on or get off the field on third downs, as appropriate — and do the same on fourth when it comes,

and you’ll probably win.


This same correlation doesn’t exist with stopping the run, running the ball, or (goddammit) time of possession, which are the things coaches and broadcasters used to talk about. Also doesn’t exist with total yards, or average starting field position, or field goal percentage, or number of first downs. (I haven’t looked at these closely!)

Conversions
Turnovers
Big Plays

are a good lens through which to watch a game.

You’re welcome!


“Okay boys. Let’s take the ball away and let’s protect the ball. Let’s take our shots. Let’s try to score on defense or in the return game. And let’s buckle down extra hard on third and fourth down.”